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Abstract This paper first derives revenue-maximizing auctions with identity-specific ex-
ternalities among all players (seller and buyers). Our main findings are as follows. Firstly,
a modified second-price sealed-bid auction with appropriate entry fees and reserve price
is revenue-maximizing. Secondly, seller may physically destroy the auctioned item if
the item is unsold or use destroying the item as nonparticipation threat. Thirdly, the
revenue-maximizing auction induces full participation of buyers. Fourthly, each losing
buyer’s payment includes an externality-correcting component that equals the allocative
externality to him. These components eliminate the impact of externalities on strategic
bidding behavior. The paper further studies revenue-maximizing auctions with finan-
cial externalities. One-to-one correspondences between revenue-maximizing auctions for
settings with and without financial externalities are established through incorporating
externality-correcting payments. This result provides a general method for designing
revenue-maximizing auctions in different settings of financial externalities, since revenue-
maximizing auctions can be obtained through transforming the revenue-maximizing auc-
tions for the regular settings without externalities.
Keywords: Auctions design; Endogenous participation; Externality.
JEL classifications: D44, D82.
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1 Introduction
Auctions design with externalities among buyers has been studied by a number of papers.
Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti (1996, 1999), Varma (2002), and Brocas (2003, 2005)
among others consider identity-specific externalities imposed on losers by the winning
buyer, while Maasland and Onderstal (2002, 2005) and Goeree, Maasland, Onderstal and
Turner (2005) study the cases where financial externalities among buyers are proportional
to the total payments of other buyers or all buyers. While the literature largely focuses
on externalities among buyers, situations abound where the existence of externalities
between the seller and buyers is the major concern. One recent example is the North
Korea’s nuclear weapon case, where the seller (North Korea) puts great externalities on
the buyers (China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, US) if it keeps its nuclear arsenal. In this
paper, we will first derive the revenue-maximizing auction while allowing identity-specific
externalities among all players, including the seller and buyers.1 We will also develop a
unified approach for deriving the revenue-maximizing auctions with financial externalities
in a general setting allowing asymmetry across buyers. This method illustrates some
common principles for revenue-maximizing auctions design in both settings with identity-
specific and financial externalities.
We first study in this paper the revenue-maximizing auction while allowing external-
ities among all players. One major contribution of this paper lies in that the analysis
brings in the option for the seller to physically destroy the item (i.e., dismantle its nuclear
arsenal) at a cost. One should note that “destroying the item” differs from “not-selling”
in our setting. In previous auctions design literature, destroying the auctioned item has
not been formulated as a possible outcome or as a nonparticipation threat. The signif-
1Potipiti (2005) also considers a setting of selling retaliation in the WTO where externalities exist
between the seller and buyers. However, both the setting and the focus of Potipiti (2005) are quite
different from that of this paper.
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icance of this option is the following. First, we are particularly interested in addressing
when and how to dismantle the nuclear weapons, i.e. under what conditions should the
seller destroy the object and what actions should be taken by the seller to maximize his
revenue if he destroys the object. Second, allowing this new option enlarges the freedom
of auctions design with externalities. Specifically, destroying the item can be an optimal
allocation outcome for the seller or be used by the seller as an optimal nonparticipation
threat, since it eliminates the externalities imposed on buyers. Specifically, eliminating
these externalities has two effects. First, seller’s threat to a buyer who refuses to partici-
pate can be made more severe. This happens when a buyer enjoys positive externalities
whoever else gets the object. In this case, the most severe nonparticipation threat is to
destroy the object. Second, the seller may extract higher rent when he destroys the object
if the object is unsold. This occurs when the sum of the seller’s valuation, the destroying
cost of the seller and the total externalities to the buyers is negative, if the seller keeps the
item. In this situation, the seller can be better off by destroying the object and collecting
a payment from each buyer which equals the externality to the buyer.
We start with a baseline setting where identity-specific externalities among all players
are public information.2 We allow heterogeneity in the externalities among the play-
ers. Moreover, our analysis does not require the externalities to be uniformly positive or
negative.
The revenue-maximizing auction is fully characterized in terms of the nonparticipa-
tion threats, the winning probabilities, the probability of destroying the item, and the
payments of buyers. A modified second-price sealed-bid auction with appropriately set
(nonnegative) entry fees and reserve price is established as the revenue-maximizing auc-
2We adopt this setting because the multi-dimensional setting in Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti
(1999) is too complicated for a thorough characterization of the optimum, and the Jehiel, Moldovanu and
Stacchetti (1996) setting is fundamentally one-dimensional.
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tion. This auction induces full participation. As a special feature, the revenue-maximizing
auction involves externality-correcting transfers between seller and losing buyers. The
detailed specifications of the auction rule are as follows. (i) If only buyer i does not
participate, the item is then assigned to the one (including the seller) generating buyer i
the smallest externality provided that this externality is nonpositive. Otherwise the seller
destroys the object. (ii) Every participant pays a nonnegative entry fee, which equals the
absolute value of the smallest possible externality to him.3 (iii) The highest buyer wins if
his bid is higher than the reserve price, and he pays the second highest bid or the reserve
price whichever is higher. Each buyer pays an externality-correcting payment (positive or
negative) that equals the allocative externality to him.4 (iv) If no buyer bids higher than
the reserve price, the seller may keep the item or destroy it. The seller destroys the item
if and only if the sum of his own valuation, his dismantling cost and the total externalities
on the buyers if he keeps the item is negative. The externality-correcting payments in the
revenue-maximizing auction lead to a situation that mimics a setting without externali-
ties to buyers. This explains intuitively why a modified second-price auction with these
externality-correcting payments is revenue-maximizing, if the entry fees and reserve price
are set appropriately.
What is the intuition behind the optimality of full participation? Note that the sum of
the externality-correcting payment and the entry fee for each buyer must be nonnegative
in the above auction. Thus, the seller gains (weakly) from the participation of every
type of buyers.5 This explains why the seller wants every type of buyers to participate,
although some types have no chance of winning.
3This smallest externality must be nonpositive due to the option of destroying the object by the seller.
4This externality-correcting payment is a unique feature which is first discovered in the literature to
my best knowledge.
5Besides the additional payment, each buyer (winner or loser) makes another nonnegative payment as
in a standard second-price auction without externalities.
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An interesting issue is whether the insights from our baseline setting also apply to
more complex settings. Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti (1996) have shown that when
buyers have private information on the externalities they create for others, the revenue-
maximizing auction design problem can be transformed into a one-dimensional problem.
Therefore, our findings obtained in the public-information externalities setting remain
valid for a multi-dimensional setting of Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti (1996). A slight
modification is to replace the public-information externalities in our results by the expec-
tations of the private-information externalities.
Based on these insights from our baseline setting, we further study the auctions design
in general settings of financial externalities where the externality to every buyer equals
a proportion of the payments of all buyers or all other buyers. Useful linkages between
revenue-maximizing auctions for settings with and without externalities are established.
Specifically, we establish one-to-one correspondences between revenue-maximizing auc-
tions with and without financial externalities. Therefore, the revenue-maximizing second-
price auction for a regular setting without externalities can be properly modified to be
revenue-maximizing in various settings of financial externalities. These findings provide
a general way of deriving the revenue-maximizing auctions for settings of financial exter-
nalities. Being consistent with the insights from our baseline setting, in all these auctions
all buyers’ payments consist of an externality-correcting component which equals the
externalities to them at the outcome of the auction. 6
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 derives the revenue-maximizing mech-
anism in our baseline setting where identity-specific externalities are public information.
We further show that for a symmetric setting the mechanism turns to be a modified
6Goeree, Maasland, Onderstal and Turner (2005) show that a lowest-price all-pay auction is revenue-
maximizing in symmetric settings of financial externalities. Applying our findings to their setting leads
to alternative revenue-maximizing second-price auctions. One advantage of this alternative second price
auction lies in that the maximal expected revenue is implemented through weakly dominant strategy.
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second price auction. This section also extends these findings to a setting where buyers
have private information on the externalities they create for others. Section 3 provides
a unified approach for deriving revenue-maximizing auctions with financial externalities,
based on the insights from our baseline setting with identity-specific externalities. Section
4 concludes.
2 The Revenue-MaximizingMechanism with Identity-
Specific Externalities
In this section we derive the revenue-maximizing mechanism when there are identity-
specific externalities among all players, including the seller and buyers. Externalities lead
to an auctions design problem in which the buyers have mechanism-dependent reservation
utilities. We will first establish that full participation is optimal in terms of the seller’s
expected revenue. For this purpose, we explicitly deal with the revenue-maximizing en-
dogenous participation. Following Stegeman (1996), we define participation of buyers as
submitting a signal. Since a mechanism implementing endogenous participation essen-
tially cannot require the buyers who do not participate to submit signals, we consider the
mechanisms based on only the signals submitted by the participating buyers.
2.1 The Setting
There is one seller who wants to sell one indivisible object to N potential buyers through
an auction. We use N = {1, 2, ..., N} to denote the set of all potential buyers, where N
is public information. The seller’s value for the object is v0, which is public information.
Hereafter, we represent the seller as player 0 and bidder i as player i. The ith buyer’s
private value of the object is vi, which is his private information. These values vi, i ∈
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N are independently distributed on intervals [vi, vi] respectively following cumulative
distribution function Fi(·) with density function fi(·)(> 0). We assume the regularity
condition that the virtual valuation functions Ji(v) = v − (1 − Fi(v))/fi(v) increase on
intervals [vi, vi]. The density fi(·) is assumed to be public information. Every buyer
observes his private value before his participation decision. The seller and the buyers are
assumed to be risk neutral.
Player i enjoys/suffers an externality ei,j when player j keeps the item, i, j = 0, 1, ..., N .
By definition, ei,i = 0, i = 0, 1, ..., N . These externalities are public information. The
auctioned item can be destroyed by the seller at a cost of c0 ≥ 0. If the item is destroyed,
no player enjoys/suffers any externality. As a result, buyer i’s payoff is vi − xi if he wins
and pays xi; his payoff is ei,j − xi if he pays xi while another player j (seller or buyer)
wins; and his payoff is −xi if he pays xi while the item is destroyed.
The timing of the game is as follows.
Time 0: The externalities ei,j, the seller’s value v0, the destroying cost c0 and the
distributions of vi, i ∈ N are revealed by Nature as public information. Every buyer
i, i ∈ N observes his private value vi.
Time 1: The seller announces the rule of the selling mechanism. The possibility of
destroying the item by the seller is allowed. We assume that the seller has the power of
committing to the proposed rule.
Time 2: The buyers simultaneously and confidentially make their participation deci-
sions and announce their bids if they decide to participate.
Time 3: The payoffs of the seller and buyers are determined according to the an-
nounced rule at time 1.
In this paper, we derive the revenue-maximizing mechanism that renders the highest
seller’s expected revenue among all threshold-participation mechanisms. Here, threshold-
participation refers to an entry pattern where the buyers only participate if their valuations
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are equal to or higher than their corresponding thresholds. First, we show that there is no
loss of generality to consider only the mechanisms that induce full participation of every
type of buyers. Here, full participation refers to the entry pattern, where every type
of buyers participates. Second, we derive the revenue-maximizing mechanism among the
full-participation class.
2.2 The Optimality of Full Participation
Based on the “semirevelation” principle established by Stegeman (1996) that allows no
participation, we only need to consider truthful direct semirevelation mechanisms, which
require buyers to submit signals if and only if they participate, and reveal truthfully their
types if they participate. Following Stegeman (1996), we introduce a null message ∅ to
denote the signal of a nonparticipant.7 Let m = (m1, m2, ..., mN), where mi is the signal
of buyer i and it takes values in Mi = [vi, vi] ∪ {∅}, ∀i ∈ N . Define M =
∏N
i=1Mi. The
seller determines how to allocate the object and how much each buyer pays, using a set
of outcome functions that accommodates all participation possibilities. These outcome
functions announced by the seller consist of the probability p0(m) for the seller to keep
the item, the winning probability functions pi(m) and payment functions xi(m) of buyer
i, ∀i ∈ N . Note that 1−∑Ni=0 pi(m) is the probability of destroying the item by the seller.
This set of allocation functions is denoted by (p,x). Following Jehiel, Moldovanu and
Stacchetti (1996), we assume that the buyers who do not participate have no chance to
win the object and their payments to the seller are zero, i.e., pi(m) = 0 and xi(m) = 0
7Unlike the revelation principle whose applicability requires full participation of buyers, the “semi-
revelation” principle accommodates all entry patterns including the full participation. Condition (10)
in Lemma 2 will further show that in our setting with allocative externalities, the mechanism should
accommodate the null signal ∅ even though full participation should be induced at the optimum.
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if mi = ∅, ∀i ∈ N .8 In addition, clearly the feasibility of mechanism (p,x) requires
∑N
i=0 pi(m) ≤ 1, ∀m ∈ M.
Define ve = (ve1, ..., veN), where vei ∈ [vi, vi] is the entry threshold for buyer i, i ∈
N . We say (p,x) is a truthful direct semirevelation mechanism implementing threshold
participation ve if and only if the following conditions hold:
(a) The buyers with private values lower than their participation thresholds do not
participate, i.e., if they participate, they get expected utility which is equal to or lower
than their expected utility from nonparticipation. Thus these types of buyers submit the
null signal;
(b) The buyers with private values equal to or higher than their participation thresh-
olds participate and reveal truthfully their valuations.
(c) pi(m) ≥ 0, ∀0 ≤ i ≤ N , with
∑N
i=0 pi(m) ≤ 1, ∀m ∈ M.
(d) pi(m) = 0 and xi(m) = 0 if mi = ∅, ∀i ∈ N , ∀m ∈ M.
When vei = vi, ∀i ∈ N , we have the case of full participation. The following Lemma
shows that we can focus on full-participation mechanisms for revenue maximization.
Lemma 1: There is no loss of generality to consider only the truthful direct semirevelation
mechanisms that induce full participation for the revenue-maximizing mechanism.
Proof: It is sufficient to show that any allocation outcome implemented by a threshold-
participation truthful direct semirevelation mechanism is replicable through a full-participation
truthful direct semirevelation mechanism.
Consider any given entry thresholds vector ve = (ve1, ..., veN) where vei ∈ [vi, vi], i ∈
N . Without loss of generality, we assume vei > vi, ∀i ∈ N . Consider a truthful direct
semirevelation mechanism (p,x) that implements ve. Then conditions (a) to (d) must
hold for (p,x).
8This assumption is consistent with the no passive reassignment (NPR) assumption adopted by
Stegeman (1996).
9
Define ηi(mi) = mi if mi ≥ vei , and ηi(mi) = ∅ otherwise. We now construct a new
direct semirevelation mechanism (p˜, x˜) as follows.
p˜(m) = p(η(m)), ∀m ∈ M,
x˜(m) = x(η(m)), ∀m ∈ M,
where η(m) = (η1(m1), η2(m2), ..., ηN(mN )), ∀m ∈ M.
Suppose that all the buyers other than i always participate regardless of their valua-
tions and they reveal truthfully their types when participating. From the construction of
(p˜, x˜), it is clearly the best strategy for buyer i to always participate and reveal truthfully
his type regardless of his type, if (p˜, x˜) is adopted. Therefore, (p˜, x˜) is a truthful direct
semirevelation mechanism that induces full participation. Furthermore, (p˜, x˜) implements
the same allocation (the players’ winning probabilities and the buyers’ payments for every
realization of the buyers’ valuations) as (p,x). Thus (p˜, x˜) must render the same expected
revenue for the seller as (p,x). 2
2.3 The Revenue-Maximizing Mechanism
For any truthful direct semirevelation mechanism (p,x) implementing full participation,
the seller’s expected revenue is given by:
R(p,x)
= Ev
{
(v0 + e0,0)p0(v) +
N∑
i=1
e0,i pi(v)− c0
(
1−
N∑
i=0
pi(v)
)
+
N∑
i=1
xi(v)
}
= Ev
{
(v0 + c0 + e0,0)p0(v) +
N∑
i=1
(e0,i + c0) pi(v) +
N∑
i=1
xi(v)
}
− c0, (1)
where v = (v1, v2, ..., vN). The support of v is V =
∏N
i=1[vi, vi].
For buyer i with private value vi, if he submits signal mi ∈ Mi, his interim expected
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payoff is given by:
Ui(vi, mi;p,x) = Ev−i
(
vi pi(mi,v−i) +
∑
j≥0
ei,j pj(mi,v−i)− xi(mi,v−i)
)
, (2)
where v−i = (v1, ..., vi−1, vi+1, ..., vN). The support of v−i is V−i =
∏N
j=1,j 6=i[vj, vj].
The seller’s optimization problem is to find the revenue-maximizing truthful direct
semirevelation mechanism (p∗,x∗) that implements full participation, i.e.,
max
(p,x)
R(p,x) (3)
Subject to:
(i) Ui(vi, vi;p,x) ≥ Ui(vi, ∅;p,x); ∀i ∈ N , ∀vi ∈ [vi, vi], (4)
(ii) Ui(vi, vi;p,x) ≥ Ui(vi, v′i;p,x); ∀i ∈ N , ∀vi ∈ [vi, vi], v′i ∈ [vi, vi], (5)
(iii) pi(m) = xi(m) = 0 if mi = ∅, pi(m) ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N ,
N∑
i=0
pi(m) ≤ 1, ∀m ∈ M. (6)
Restrictions (4)-(6) come from conditions (a)-(d).
For any direct semirevelation mechanism (p,x) implementing full participation, we
define
Qi(vi;p) = Ev−ipi(v). (7)
If (p,x) is a truthful direct semirevelation mechanism implementing full participation,
then Qi(vi;p) is the conditional expected probability that buyer i wins the object if his
private value is vi.
As in Myerson (1981), we have the following necessary and sufficient conditions for a
direct semirevelation mechanism to be a truthful direct semirevelation mechanism that
implements full participation.9
9The proof is omitted as it follows closely Myerson (1981). For the same reason, the proof for Lemma
3 is also omitted.
11
Lemma 2: Direct semirevelation mechanism (p,x) is a truthful direct semirevelation
mechanism that implements full participation, if and only if ∀i ∈ N the following condi-
tions and (6) hold:
Qi(si;p) ≤ Qi(vi;p), ∀vi ≤ si ≤ vi ≤ vi, (8)
Ui(vi, vi;p,x) = Ui(vi, vi;p,x) +
∫ vi
vi
Qi(si;p)dsi, ∀vi ∈ [vi, vi], (9)
Ui(vi, vi;p,x) ≥ Ui(vi, ∅;p,x). (10)
Note that (10) differs from its counterpart in Lemma 2 of Myerson (1981). In My-
erson (1981), the outside utility level Ui(vi, ∅;p,x) that buyer i obtains if he does not
participate is not mechanism dependent. In particular, Ui(vi, ∅;p,x) is fixed at zero in
Myerson (1981). However, in our setting with allocative externalities, Ui(vi, ∅;p,x) must
be determined by the mechanism adopted and thus can differ from zero.
Based on Lemma 2, we can replace (4) and (5) by (8), (9) and (10) in the seller’s
optimization problem. As a result, the expected revenue of the seller from a mechanism
(p,x) satisfying conditions (4)-(6) is given in the following Lemma.
Lemma 3: For a truthful direct semirevelation mechanism (p,x) that implements full
participation, the seller’s expected revenue can be written as
R(p,x) = Ev
{ N∑
i=0
pi(v)J˜i(vi)
}
− c0 −
N∑
i=1
Ui(vi, vi;p,x), (11)
where J˜i(vi) = Ji(vi) + c0 +
∑
j≥0 ej,i, i = 0, 1, ..., N are defined as the augmented virtual
value functions.10
Based on Lemma 3, we are then able to characterize the revenue-maximizing mecha-
nism as in the following proposition.
10Note that J˜0(v0) = v0 + c0 +
∑
j≥0 ej,0. We use J˜
−1
i (·) to denote the inverse function of J˜i(·). If
x < vi− 1fi(vi) + c0+
∑
j≥0 ej,i, J˜
−1
i (x) is defined as vi; if x > vi+ c0+
∑
j≥0 ej,i, J˜
−1
i (x) is defined as vi.
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Proposition 1: The following mechanism is a truthful direct semirevelation mechanism
that maximizes the seller’s expected revenue. The mechanism induces full participation.
(i) If only buyer i submits signal ∅, the item is assigned to the one (including the seller)
who brings him the smallest externality provided that it is nonpositive, otherwise the seller
destroys the item.
(ii) Every participating buyer pays a nonnegative entry fee, which equals the absolute value
of the smallest possible externality to him.11
(iii) If all buyers participate and buyer i, ∀i ∈ N submits signal mi ∈ [vi, vi], the object is
assigned to the player (including the seller) whose signal renders the highest “augmented
virtual value”, provided this value is nonnegative.12 Ties are broken randomly. If this
value is negative, the object is destroyed by the seller.
(iv) The winning buyer i pays J˜−1i (max{0,maxNj=0,j 6=i J˜j(vj)}) besides the entry fee. On
top of the entry fee, each losing buyer pays an externality-correcting payment (positive or
negative) that equals the allocative externality to him.
Proof: From (11), a truthful direct semirevelation mechanism that induces full partici-
pation must be revenue-maximizing if it satisfies the following two conditions. First, it
minimizes Ui(vi, vi;p,x), ∀i ∈ N . Second, it also maximizes
∑N
i=0 pi(v)J˜i(vi), ∀v ∈ V.
We next put forward a direct semirevelation mechanism (p∗,x∗) that satisfies the above
criterion and thus maximizes the seller’s expected revenue. We then verify that (p∗,x∗)
is truthful.
First, Ui(vi, ∅;p,x) can be pushed to take the lowest possible value minj≥0 ei,j. This
can be achieved by the following specification. If ei,j0 ≤ 0 where j0 = argminj≥0,j 6=iei,j,
then set p∗j0(mi,v−i) = 1 where mi = ∅. If ei,j0 > 0, then set p
∗
j(mi,v−i) = 0 for j ≥ 0.
The above specifications mean that when minj≥0,j 6=i ei,j ≤ 0, the item is assigned to the
11This smallest externality must be nonpositive due to the option of destroying the object by the seller.
12We treat the seller’s signal as v0.
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player who brings buyer i the smallest externality, if buyer i does not participate; when
minj≥0,j 6=i ei,j > 0, the item is destroyed by the seller. When the item is destroyed,
externalities cease to exist. As ei,i = 0, ∀i ∈ N , we have that Ui(vi, ∅;p,x) = minj≥0 ei,j
always holds for the above specifications of the optimal nonparticipation threats. Clearly,
minj≥0 ei,j (≤ 0) is the lowest utility possible for buyer i if he does not participate.
Second, Ui(vi, vi;p,x) can be driven down to exactly equal Ui(vi, ∅;p,x), which in
turn equals minj≥0 ei,j. Note that Ui(vi, vi;p,x) cannot be lower than Ui(vi, ∅;p,x) from
(10). The full participation payment x∗i (v) pushing Ui(vi, vi;p,x) to minj≥0 ei,j is defined
as below for any given set of full participation winning probabilities pi(v), ∀0 ≤ i ≤ N .
From Lemma 2, we have Ui(vi, vi;p,x) = Ui(vi, vi;p,x)−
∫ vi
vi
Qi(si;p)dsi. Thus from (2)
and (7), x∗i (v) must satisfy
min
j≥0
ei,j = Ev−i
(
vi pi(v) +
∑
j≥0
ei,j pj(v)− x∗i (v)−
∫ vi
vi
pi(si,v−i)dsi
)
, ∀i ∈ N . (12)
Naturally, we define
x∗i (v) = vi pi(v) +
∑
j≥0
ei,j pj(v)−minj≥0 ei,j −
∫ vi
vi
pi(si,v−i)dsi, ∀i ∈ N . (13)
Clearly, the above defined nonparticipation threats and full-participation payments
x∗(v) = (x∗i (v)) minimize Ui(vi, vi;p,x), ∀i ∈ N , for any given set of full participation
winning probabilities pi(v), ∀0 ≤ i ≤ N .
Third, we define the set of full-participation winning probabilities p∗(v) = (p∗i (v))
that maximizes ∑Ni=0 pi(v)J˜i(vi), ∀v ∈ V. Clearly, the winning probability of player i, i =
0, 1, ..., N should be defined as follows.
p∗i (v) =



1, if J˜i(vi) > maxNj=0,j 6=i J˜j(vj) and J˜i(vi) ≥ 0,
0, otherwise.
(14)
As usual, ties are broken randomly.
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The corresponding set of full-participation payments x∗(v) is then defined as follows
according to (13). For buyer i, i ∈ N ,
x∗i (v) =



J˜−1i (max{0,maxNj=0,j 6=i J˜j(vj)}) + Ei, if i wins,
ei,j + Ei, if j(≥ 0) wins,
Ei, if the object is destroyed,
(15)
where Ei = −minj≥0 ei,j.
The full-participation winning probabilities and payments functions x∗(v) and p∗(v)
together with the optimal nonparticipation threats lead to a Nash equilibrium in which
every type of buyers participates and reveals truthfully their types, because the conditions
in lemma 2 are satisfied. We thus have that the full-participation winning probabilities and
payments functions x∗(v) and p∗(v) together with the optimal nonparticipation threats
constitute a truthful direct semirevelation mechanism that maximizes the seller’s ex-
pected revenue. In the same spirit of Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti (1996), there is
no need to consider the joint deviation from the Nash equilibrium.13 Thus all the other
winning probabilities and payments functions which are not relevant to the equilibrium
path can be specified in any way. 2
Proposition 1 answers the questions of when the auctioned object is destroyed by the
seller and how the seller should proceed to maximize his expected revenue if the auctioned
item is to be destroyed. From Proposition 1, we have the following results regarding the
possibility of destroying the object.
Corollary 1: If J˜0(v0) = v0 + c0 +
∑
j≥0 ej,0 ≥ 0, the object is never destroyed by the
seller. If instead J˜0(v0) = v0+ c0+
∑
j≥0 ej,0 < 0, the object is destroyed by the seller with
probability ∏Ni=1 Pr(p∗i (v) = 0), which equals
∏N
i=1 Fi(J−1i (−c0 −
∑
j≥0 ej,i)).14
13Footnote 11 in Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti (1996) points out that joint deviations of buyers are
irrelevant since full-participation Nash equilibrium is studied.
14We use J−1i (·) to denote the inverse function of Ji(·). If x < vi − 1fi(vi) , J
−1
i (x) is defined as vi; if
15
We use (p0,x0) to denote the revenue-maximizing mechanism when the externalities
are ei,j, i, j ∈ {0, 1, ..., N}. When ei,0, ∀i ∈ N are negative enough, we have minj≥0 ei,j =
ei,0, ∀i ∈ N . Thus Ui(vi, vi;p0,x0) = ei,0, ∀i ∈ N . From (11), the optimal expected
revenue for the seller is
R(p0,x0) = −c0 −
∑
j≥0
ej,0 +
∫
V
{
p00(v)(v0 + c0 +
∑
j≥0
ej,0)
+
N∑
i=1
p0i (v)(vi + c0 +
∑
j≥0
ej,i −
1− Fi(vi)
fi(vi)
)
}
f(v)dv.
Let R′(p0,x0) denote the value of the right-hand-side of R(p0,x0) when ei,0 decreases to
e′i,0 i ∈ N . Clearly R′(p0,x0) ≥ R(p0,x0) as p00(v) ∈ [0, 1]. Suppose when ei,0 decreases to
e′i,0 i ∈ N , the corresponding revenue-maximizing auction rule changes to (p′,x′). Denote
the optimal expected revenue by R(p′,x′) when externalities ei,0 decrease to e′i,0, i ∈ N .
We must have R(p′,x′) ≥ R′(p0,x0). Therefore, R(p′,x′) ≥ R(p0,x0), i.e., the seller’s
optimal expected revenue increase as ei,0 decreases. This helps to explain why North
Korea tries to convince the relevant countries that it owns very powerful nuclear weapon.
2.4 The Revenue-Maximizing Auction in Symmetric Setting
We now show that the revenue-maximizing mechanism derived above reduces to a mod-
ified second price auction in a symmetric setting. In this symmetric setting, Fi(·) =
F (·), fi(·) = f(·) on support [v, v], ∀i ∈ N . In addition, ei,0 = ej,0 = ea,0, e0,i = e0,j =
e0,a, ei,j = e, ∀i, j ∈ N . As usual, we assume the regularity condition that the virtual val-
uation J(v) = v− 1−F (v)f(v) is an increasing function. The augmented virtual value function
of a representative buyer is defined as J˜(·) = J(·) + c0 +
∑
j≥0 ej,i. The inverse function
of J˜(·) is denoted by J˜−1(·).
x > vi, J−1i (x) is defined as vi.
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Based on (14) and (15), the winning probability of buyer i, ∀i ∈ N is defined as
p∗i (v) =



1 if vi ≥ zi(v−i),
0 if vi < zi(v−i),
(16)
and his payment is defined as
x∗i (v) =



zi(v−i)−minj≥0 ei,j, if i wins,
ei,j −minj≥0 ei,j, if j(≥ 0) wins,
−minj≥0 ei,j, if the object is destroyed,
(17)
where zi(v−i) = max{maxj 6=i,j∈N vj, J˜−1(max{0, v0 + c0 +
∑
j≥0 ej,0})}. In addition,
p∗0(v) =



1, if J˜(maxNj=1 vj) < v0 + c0 +
∑
j≥0 ej,0 ≥ 0,
0, otherwise.
(18)
Eq. (17) means that every buyer i pays an entry fee of−minj≥0 ei,j. Moreover, if buyer
i wins, he pays an additional zi(v−i). If he loses, he pays an externality-correcting payment
that equals the externality he enjoys or suffers. From (18), if v0 + c0 +
∑
j≥0 ej,0 ≥ 0, the
seller keeps it when the object is not sold out, while if v0+ c0+
∑
j≥0 ej,0 < 0, it is optimal
for the seller to destroy the unsold object. In case that the sum of the seller’s valuation,
the destroying cost of the seller and the total externalities to the buyers is negative when
the seller keeps the item, intuitively the seller is better off by destroying the object and
collecting a payment from each buyer that equals the externality to him.
Based on the above results, we have the following proposition that describes the
revenue-maximizing auction.
Proposition 2: In a symmetric setting with identity-specific externalities among the
seller and buyers, a modified second-price sealed-bid auction with the following features is
the revenue-maximizing auction.
(a) The nonparticipation threats take the same form as in Proposition 1(i). Every partic-
ipant pays an entry fee defined as in Proposition 1(ii).
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(b) If all buyers participate, the highest buyer wins if his bid is higher than the reserve
price, and he pays the second highest bid or the reserve price, whichever is higher. The
reserve price is set at J˜−1(max{0, v0 + c0 +
∑
j≥0 ej,0}). If no buyer bids higher than the
reserve price, then the seller destroys the item if v0 + c0 +
∑
j≥0 ej,0 < 0, otherwise he
keeps the item.
(c) Each losing buyer pays an externality-correcting payment equal to the allocative exter-
nality to him.
Each buyer’s payment is adjusted by the amount of allocative externality to him, while
he suffers or enjoys this externality at the same time. This creates a situation where buyers
bid as if there is no externality on them. Based on similar arguments for the standard
second-price auction, bidding his true valuation is a weakly dominant strategy for every
buyer in the second price auction specified in Proposition 2. This is why a modified second-
price auction with the externality-correcting payments is revenue-maximizing, provided
that the reserve price and entry fee are properly set. In Proposition 2, the entry fee is
set at the highest possible level which can be supported by the optimal nonparticipation
threats, and the optimal reserve price is determined by the seller’s augmented value v0 +
c0 +
∑
j≥0 ej,0.
2.5 When buyers Have Private Information on the Externalities
They Create on Others
An interesting issue is the extent to which the results obtained in a public-information
externalities setting apply to a multi-dimensional setting where buyers have private in-
formation on the externalities they create on others. Specifically, we consider the setting
where ej,i, ∀0 ≤ j ≤ N, are buyer i’s private information. We assume that all vk and
ej,i, ∀0 ≤ k, i, j ≤ N are mutually independent and their distributions are public infor-
mation.
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Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti (1996) look at a 2-dimensional setting where win-
ning buyer impose the same externality on other buyers. They show that the winning
probability of any buyer must not depend on his externality signal because of the ratio-
nality condition. Therefore the private information on externality is a redundant signal,
and thus the auction design problem is a one-dimensional program in nature. Although
Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti (1996) show these results while assuming losing buyers
suffer the same externality, it is clear that all these results still hold when players experi-
ence heterogenous externalities, as long as players’ private information is the externalities
they create on other players. Specifically, the revenue-maximizing auction problem can
be transformed into a one-dimensional program by first integrating over the externali-
ties dimensions. The one-dimensional program obtained is fundamentally the same as the
problem assuming public-information externalities. The only difference is that the public-
information externalities in the baseline setting are replaced by the expected externalities.
Note that these expected externalities are also public information as the distributions of
the externalities are public information.
Based on the above arguments, clearly the revenue-maximizing mechanism for the
multi-dimensional setting considered can be obtained through replacing the public-information
externalities by the expectations of the private-information externalities in our results for
the public-information externalities setting.
3 A Unified Approach for Auctions Design with Fi-
nancial Externalities
In Section 2, we studied the revenue-maximizing auction when the externalities among
the players are exogenous. As a special feature, the revenue-maximizing auction requires
that every buyer’s payment consists of an externality-correcting component which equals
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the allocative externality to him. In this section, we conduct further studies on revenue-
maximizing auctions for general settings with financial externalities where the externalities
among buyers are endogenously determined by their payments and there is no external-
ities between seller and buyers. Useful linkages between revenue-maximizing auctions
for settings with and without externalities are established based on the insights from
Section 2. Specifically, we will establish one-to-one correspondences between revenue-
maximizing auctions with and without externalities. Therefore, revenue-maximizing auc-
tions for various settings of financial externalities can be obtained through transforming
the revenue-maximizing second-price auction for a regular setting without externalities. In
other words, our findings provide a general approach for deriving the revenue-maximizing
auctions with financial externalities.
Goeree, Maasland, Onderstal and Turner (2005) show that a lowest-price all-pay auc-
tion is revenue-maximizing in a symmetric setting of financial externalities. Our general
result leads to alternative revenue-maximizing second-price auction for their setting, which
implements the maximal expected revenues through weakly dominant strategy. Being
consistent with the insights from our baseline setting, in this alternative auction all buy-
ers’ payments consist of an externality-correcting component which equals the allocative
externalities to them.
3.1 When Externalities Are Proportional to the Total Payments
of All buyers
We first consider a setting where each buyer enjoys a positive externality that equals a
proportion of the total payments of all buyers. Specifically, we assume the buyers’ private
values vi, i ∈ N are independently distributed on interval [vi, vi] following respectively
cumulative distribution function Fi(·) with density function fi(·)(> 0). We assume the
regularity condition that the virtual valuation functions Ji(v) = v − (1 − Fi(v))/fi(v)
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increase on interval [vi, vi]. The seller’s valuation is zero. Buyer i, i ∈ N enjoys a
positive externality which equals a proportion αi of the total payments of all buyers.
Denote the payment of buyer i by xi, i ∈ N . Buyer i’s payoff is then vi − xi + α
∑N
j=1 xj
if he wins; his payoff is (α∑Nj=1 xj)− xi if he does not win. We assume
∑N
i=1 αi ∈ [0, 1).
This setting is a generalization from Goeree, Maasland, Onderstal and Turner (2005).15
If αi = 0, ∀i ∈ N , then we have a usual setting without externalities.
Similar to Lemma 1 for the case of identity-specific externalities, for the above setting
of financial externalities there is no loss of generality to consider only the truthful di-
rect semirevelation mechanisms that induce full participation for the revenue-maximizing
mechanism.16 We thus focus on the truthful direct semirevelation mechanisms that induce
full participation in this section.17
Suppose (p,x) is a truthful direct semirevelation mechanism that induces full partic-
ipation in the usual setting without externalities. We define p˜ = p, and define a new
full-participation payment x˜i(v) of buyer i by xi(v) + αi1−∑Nj=1 αj
∑N
j=1 xj(v), ∀i ∈ N .
Here, xi(·), ∀i ∈ N is buyer i’s payment in (p,x). In addition, buyer i’s payment x˜i(·)
is set to be zero if he does not participate, and his payment x˜i(·) for all other cases can
be defined in any way. The above defined (p˜, x˜) must be a truthful direct semirevela-
tion mechanism that induces full participation for our setting with financial externalities.
This is true as −x˜i(v)+αi
∑N
j=1 x˜j(v) = −xi(v), ∀i ∈ N . For the same reason, if (p˜′, x˜′)
is a truthful direct revelation mechanism that induces full participation for our setting
with financial externalities, then (p′,x′) must be a truthful direct revelation mechanism
that induces full participation for the setting without externalities, where p′ = p˜′ and
15Goeree, Maasland, Onderstal and Turner (2005) instead assumes symmetry across buyers.
16The proof is omitted as it is similar to the proof of Lemma 1.
17Note that for a regular setting without externalities, a truthful direct semirevelation mechanism
inducing full participation is well defined, although the utility of a nonparticipant from a truthful direct
semirevelation mechanism is no longer mechanism-dependent.
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x′i(v) = x˜′i(v)− αi
∑N
j=1 x˜′j(v), ∀i ∈ N .
Note that Ev(
∑N
j=1 xj(v)) is the expected revenue from (p,x) in the setting with-
out externalities, and Ev(
∑N
j=1 x˜j(v)) is the expected revenue from (p˜, x˜) in the set-
ting with financial externalities.18 Since
∑N
j=1 xj(v) = (1−
∑N
i=1 αi)
∑N
j=1 x˜j(v), we have
Ev(
∑N
j=1 xj(v)) = (1−
∑N
i=1 αi)Ev(
∑N
j=1 x˜j(v)). Clearly, the same relation holds between
mechanisms (p˜′, x˜′) and (p′,x′). Based on these observations, we must have the following
results.
Proposition 3: (i) If (p,x) is a revenue-maximizing truthful direct semirevelation mech-
anism that induces full participation in the setting without externalities, then the corre-
sponding (p˜, x˜) defined above must be a revenue-maximizing truthful direct semirevelation
mechanism that induces full participation in the setting with financial externalities. (ii)
If (p˜′, x˜′) is a revenue-maximizing truthful direct semirevelation mechanism that induces
full participation in the setting with financial externalities, then (p′,x′) defined above must
be a revenue-maximizing truthful direct semirevelation mechanism that induces full par-
ticipation in the setting without externalities. (iii) The seller’s expected revenue from
any revenue-maximizing auction with financial externalities equals 1
1−
∑N
i=1 αi
times of that
from any revenue-maximizing auction without externalities.
Proposition 3(i) means that if we know the revenue-maximizing auction without ex-
ternalities, then the revenue-maximizing auction with externalities can easily be obtained.
Proposition 3(iii) means that the seller’s optimal expected revenue does not depend on the
distribution of the externalities across the buyers. For our general setting with financial
externalities, we define the following mechanism.
(a.1) There is no entry fee, the reserve price for buyer i, ∀i ∈ N is vˆi (≥ vi), which is
the unique solution of Ji(vˆi) = 0;
(a.2) If at least one buyer does not participate, the seller keeps the item to create zero
18Note that destroying the item is never desired in the case of financial externalities.
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externality for all buyers;
(a.3) If all participate, we denote buyer i’s bid by bi, ∀i ∈ N . Buyer i wins if Ji(bi) is the
highest among all Jj(bj), ∀j ∈ N and bi ≥ vˆi. Ties are broken randomly. Suppose buyer
i, ∀i ∈ N is the winner. The payments are the following. First, buyer i pays z1, which is
J−1i (maxNj=1,j 6=i Jj(bj)) or the reserve price vˆi (≥ vi), whichever is higher. Second, every
buyer j ∈ N pays z2 = αjz11−∑Ni=1 αi
. If no one wins, the seller keeps the item, and no one
pays.
Corollary 2: The mechanism defined by (a.1), (a.2) and (a.3) is revenue-maximizing for
our setting with financial externalities.
Proof: The result follows immediately from Proposition 3(i). From Myerson (1981), we
have that in the setting without externalities, the auction defined in (a.1) to (a.3) with
z2 = 0 is a revenue-maximizing truthful direct semirevelation mechanism. It follows from
Proposition 3(i) that the mechanism defined in (a.1) to (a.3) is a revenue-maximizing
truthful direct semirevelation mechanism for our setting with financial externalities. 2
Goeree, Maasland, Onderstal and Turner (2005) study a symmetric independent pri-
vate value setting where buyers’ values follow cumulative distribution function F (·) on
[v, v] and the seller’s valuation is zero. They assume that each buyer enjoys a positive
externality which equals a common proportion (denoted by α < 1N where N is the number
of buyers) of the total payments of all buyers. They show that a two-stage lowest-price
all-pay auction with proper entry fee Φ and reserve price R is revenue-maximizing. In
the first stage, buyers make the decision whether or not to pay the entry fee and partic-
ipate. All types of buyers participate, however, there exists a bidding threshold vˆ (≥ v)
which is also the threshold of winning type. The bidding threshold vˆ is the unique so-
lution of vˆ − 1−F (vˆ)F ′(vˆ) = 0, the reserve price R equals
vˆF (vˆ)N−1
1−α and the entry fee Φ equals
αR(N−1)(1−F (vˆ))
1−Nα .
19
19Please refer to Proposition 5 in Goeree, Maasland, Onderstal and Turner (2005) for details.
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For this symmetric setting, the revenue-maximizing auction defined by (a.1) to (a.3)
can be described as follows.
(b.1) There is no entry fee, the reserve price is vˆ (≥ v);
(b.2) If at least one buyer does not participate, the seller keeps the item to create zero
externality for all buyers;
(b.3) If all participate, the highest buyer wins if his bid is no less than the reserve price
vˆ, and his payment consists of two components. First, he pays z1, which is the second
highest bid or the reserve price vˆ (> v), whichever is higher. Second, every buyer pays
z2, where z2 = αz11−αN > 0. If the highest bid is less than vˆ, the seller keeps the item, and
no one pays.
From Corollary 2, the auction defined by (b.1), (b.2) and (b.3) is also revenue-maximizing.
We thus have the following result.
Corollary 3: The modified second price auction defined by (b.1), (b.2) and (b.3) is revenue
equivalent to the revenue-maximizing two-stage lowest-price all-pay auction established by
Goeree, Maasland, Onderstal and Turner (2005).
3.2 When Externalities Are Proportional to the Other Buyer’s
Total Payments
We now turn to a setting of financial externalities where each buyer instead enjoys a
positive externality which equals a proportion (denoted by ϕ < 1N−1) of the total payments
of the other buyers. The seller’s valuation is zero. The buyers’ private values vi, i ∈ N are
independently distributed on interval [vi, vi] following respectively cumulative distribution
function Fi(·) with density function fi(·)(> 0). The virtual valuation functions Ji(v) =
v − (1 − Fi(v))/fi(v) increase on [vi, vi]. Denote the payment of buyer i by xi, i ∈ N .
Buyer i’s payoff is then vi − xi +ϕ
∑N
j=1,j 6=i xj if he wins; his payoff is (ϕ
∑N
j=1,j 6=i xj)− xi
if he does not win. If ϕ = 0, then we have a usual setting without externalities.
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For the same reason as in Section 3.1, we can focus on the truthful direct semirevela-
tion mechanisms that induce full participation for the revenue-maximization. Similar to
Proposition 3, we have the following results.20
Proposition 4: (i) If (p,x) is a revenue-maximizing truthful direct semirevelation mecha-
nism that induces full participation in the setting without externalities, then (p˜, x˜) must be
a revenue-maximizing truthful direct semirevelation mechanism that induces full participa-
tion in the setting with externalities, where p˜ = p and x˜i(v) = 11+ϕ [xi(v)+
ϕ
1−(N−1)ϕ
∑N
j=1 xj(v)],
∀i ∈ N .21 (ii) If (p˜′, x˜′) is a revenue-maximizing truthful direct semirevelation mecha-
nism that induces full participation in the setting with financial externalities, then (p′,x′)
must be a revenue-maximizing truthful direct semirevelation mechanism that induces full
participation in the setting without externalities, where p′ = p˜′ and x′i(v) = x˜′i(v) −
ϕ∑Nj=1,j 6=i x˜′j(v), ∀i ∈ N . (iii) The seller’s expected revenue from any revenue-maximizing
auction with financial externalities equals 11−(N−1)ϕ times of that from any revenue-maximizing
auction without externalities.
For our setting where the externality to each buyer depends on the other buyers’ total
payments, we define the following mechanism.
(c.1) There is no entry fee, the reserve price for buyer i, ∀i ∈ N is vˆi (≥ vi), which is
the unique solution of Ji(vˆi) = 0;
(c.2) If at least one buyer does not participate, the seller keeps the item to create zero
externality for all buyers;
(c.3) If all participate, we denote buyer i’s bid by bi, ∀i ∈ N . buyer i wins if Ji(bi) is the
highest among all Jj(bj), ∀j ∈ N and bi ≥ vˆi. Ties are broken randomly. Suppose buyer
i, ∀i ∈ N is the winner. The payments are the following. First, buyer i pays z1, which
20The proof is omitted as it is similar to that of Proposition 3.
21Buyer i’s payment x˜i(·) is set to be zero if he does not participate, and his payment x˜i(·) for all other
cases can be defined in any way.
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is J−1i (maxj 6=i Jj(bj)) or the reserve price vˆi (≥ vi), whichever is higher. Second, he pays
ϕ(N −1)z2, where z2 = ϕz11−ϕ(N−2)−ϕ2(N−1) > 0. Every losing buyer pays z2. If no one wins,
the seller keeps the item, and no one pays.
Corollary 4: The mechanism defined by (c.1), (c.2) and (c.3) is revenue-maximizing for
the setting where each buyer enjoys an externality equal to a proportion ϕ of the other
buyers’ total payments.
Proof: The result follows immediately from Proposition 4(i). From Myerson (1981), we
have that in the setting without externalities, the auction defined in (c.1) to (c.3) with
z2 = 0 is a revenue-maximizing truthful direct semirevelation mechanism. It follows from
Proposition 4(i) that the mechanism defined by (c.1) to (c.3) is a revenue-maximizing
truthful direct semirevelation mechanism for the setting considered. 2
In Maasland and Onderstal (2002), buyers’ private signals ti, ∀i ∈ N follow the same
distribution on [t, t]. buyers’ valuations vi, ∀i ∈ N are functions of the buyers’ signals t =
(t1, t2, ..., tN). The seller’s valuation is zero. Each buyer enjoys a positive externality which
equals a proportion of the other buyers’ total payments. Although Proposition 4 does not
directly apply to the setting of Maasland and Onderstal (2002), clearly the essence of
our results extends to their setting. As long as we know the revenue-maximizing auction
for the corresponding setting without externalities, the revenue-maximizing auction with
financial externalities can be obtained through modifying the payment functions following
Proposition 4(i).
3.3 Some Remarks
Consistent with the findings of Sections 2.2 and 2.3, every buyer’s payment consists of
a component that equals the allocative externalities to them in the revenue-maximizing
auctions proposed in Sections 3.2 and 3.3. Moreover, the spirit of the revenue-maximizing
auctions of Section 3 also catches the essence of constructing the optimal nonparticipation
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threats and optimal entry fees in Sections 2.2 and 2.3. All these results suggest that
the findings from our baseline identity-specific setting extend to the case of financial
externalities. Interestingly, in the Section 3 auctions, the optimal reserve prices are set
in the same way as in Myerson (1981) where no externalities are involved. This result is
quite intuitive as the Sections 3 auctions create an environment that mimics one without
externalities. Thus the optimal reserve price should be set in the same way as in Myerson
(1981).
4 Conclusion
This paper first derives the revenue-maximizing mechanism when identity-specific exter-
nalities among all players (seller and buyers) are allowed. These externalities are not
restricted to be uniformly negative or positive. For a symmetric setting, the revenue-
maximizing mechanism derived reduces to be a modified second price auction. We show
that introducing the possibility for the seller to destroy the item enlarges the freedom of
revenue-maximizing mechanism design. At the optimum, the seller may keep or destroy
the item if it is unsold. The seller destroys the item if and only if the sum of his own
valuation, his dismantling cost and the total externalities on the buyers if he keeps the
item is negative. When buyers suffer highly negative externalities if the seller holds the
item, we find that the seller’s optimal expected revenue increases as these externalities
become more negative. This provides an alternative explanation to why North Korea tries
to convince relevant countries that its nuclear weapons are powerful.
Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti (1996) point out that the seller is better off by not
selling at all if the total externalities generated by a sale is larger than total valuations.
Our analysis reveals that the seller can be further better off by physically destroying the
item while extracting payments from all buyers, if the sum of his valuation, his dismantling
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cost and the total externalities to the buyers is negative when he keeps the item. This
reveals that the crucial force driving the dismantling result is the externalities on the
buyers imposed by the seller instead of those among the buyers.
A unique feature of the revenue-maximizing mechanism established is that buyer’s
payments consist of externality-correcting components that equal the allocative external-
ity to him. These components eliminate the impact of the externalities on the strategic
bidding behavior. Introducing these externality-correcting payments leads to a situa-
tion that mimics a standard auctions design problem with no externalities to buyers.
This is why a modified second-price auction with these externality-correcting payments is
revenue-maximizing in a symmetric setting, provided that the entry fees and reserve price
are appropriately set. Since the sum of the externality-correcting payment and the entry
fee for every buyer is always nonnegative, there is no loss of generality to consider only the
full-participation mechanisms for the revenue-maximizing auction with externalities.22
Although the above feature of the revenue-maximizing auction and other findings are
established in a baseline setting where the identity-specific externalities are public infor-
mation, these are still valid in an environment where players have private information on
the externalities they create for others. Moreover, these insights lead to interesting results
on auctions design in general settings with financial externalities, where the externality
to every buyer depends on other buyers’ total payments or those of all buyers. We estab-
lish one-to-one correspondences between revenue-maximizing auctions with and without
externalities. As a result, the revenue-maximizing second-price auction for a regular set-
ting without externalities can be properly modified to be revenue-maximizing in various
settings of financial externalities. These findings provide a general approach for deriving
revenue-maximizing auctions for settings with financial externalities.
22Please refer to footnote 5.
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